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ABSTRACT 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and its implementing concept, Sea 
Based Logistics (SBL), stress the need for logistically supporting forces ashore directly 
from a sea base. This implies a radically different approach for supporting forces ashore 
in the future. This study analyzes the concept of SBL in the area of inter-ship and intra- 
ship movement of materiel as well as ship-to-objective materiel movement in order to 
gain insight into the envisioned SBL support concept. This study presents a conceptual 
model blending aspects of current underway replenishment (UNREP) processes with an 
operational scenario incorporating the tenets of the OMFTS and SBL concepts.   A 
baseline simulation model was developed to estimate UNREP cycle times under various 
scenarios.  Experiments were conducted by modifying the baseline model to assess the 
impact on inter/intra ship materiel movement cycle time by increasing the lift capacity of 
the helicopters used for vertical replenishment (VERTREP) as well as increasing the 
number helicopters used for VERTREP.   Results indicate that an increase in helicopter 
lift capacity significantly reduce overall cycle time, more importantly UNREP cycle time. 
The simulation model identifies constraining resources (i.e., elevators and forklifts) that 
are on the critical path of operations.   Results of this thesis will eventually help to 
configure the amphibious ships used for SBL in the future. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
No matter who carries the load in any fight, soldiers, sailors, airmen, or 
marines.. .they need to be supported and supplied from the sea. 
-Admiral A. A. Burke, USN 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a new global environment. 
This new environment is characterized by regional instability and greater uncertainty 
about new threats to our national security. The United States has been adjusting its 
national security strategy to meet the needs of this new environment. In 1992 the Navy 
and Marine Corps issued a white paper entitled "from the Sea" as its response to the new 
global environment. This announced a shift of strategy from traditional open-ocean 
fighting toward expeditionary operations conducted from the sea in the world's littoral 
regions. In 1994 a second white paper "Forward...from the Sea" further expanded the 
concepts of the original white paper. This stressed the role of naval expeditionary forces 
in peacetime operations, crisis response, and their role in regional conflicts. [Ref. 1] 
The Marine Corps expanded the concepts delivered in these two white papers by 
developing a vision for future amphibious operations. They entitled this vision 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) [Ref. 2]. OMFTS focuses on striking 
operational objectives directly from the sea. This departs from traditional amphibious 
doctrine that requires seizure of a beachhead and buildup of forces ashore prior to seizing 
an objective. The Sea Based Logistics (SBL) concept was developed to support OMFTS. 
[Ref. 3] 
In addition the "Maritime Prepositioning Force for the 21st Century (MPF Future 
(MPF (F)) " concept is being developed to replace the current MPF capability [Ref. 4]. 
The tenets of the Sea Based Logistics concept are being incorporated into the design of 
the MPF (F). These concepts stress the need to possess a capability to support operations 
ashore directly from the sea. This departs from the current practice of building combat 
service supports areas (CSSAs) ashore and from current MPF doctrine. Under this 
concept, MPF (F) ships would be able to support the Amphibious Task Force from the 
sea. No longer would a port and airfield be necessary to marry up the Marines and their 
equipment. [Ref. 4] 
Currently ships are not designed to support forces ashore in the same manner that 
a CSS A can. Unlike a supply warehouse where clerks can access any item directly, our 
ships are loaded to utilize every square and cubic foot. Items are stowed in large 
containers that are loaded to optimize available space. Gaining access to specific items 
can be very difficult. Items are shuffled around in order to get to other items stowed 
deeper in the ship. The Sea Based Logistics concept strives to make all items available 
when needed. This implies that a radically different approach to ship design needs to be 
developed. 
B.       PURPOSE 
This research will analyze the concept of Sea Based Logistics in the area of inter- 
ship and intra-ship movement of materiel. The purpose of this research is to provide 
insight that should be considered in the design of the future sea based logistics platform. 
The objective is to aid in future research and development by providing analysis of 
inter/intra ship materiel movement in the SBL concept. 
C.       SCOPE 
This project focuses on the analysis of inter/intra ship materiel movement set 
against the backdrop of the OMFTS and SBL concepts. To accomplish this, we strive to 
answer the following questions: 
• What is the impact of increased helicopter lift capacity on inter/intra ship 
materiel movement cycle time? 
• What is the impact of increasing the number of helicopters conducting 
vertical replenishment on inter/intra ship materiel movement cycle time? 
We first provide the reader an overview of the OMFTS, Ship To Objective 
Maneuver (STOM), SBL, and MPF (F) concepts. We then provide an overview of 
current methods of inter/intra ship materiel movement. Providing logistics support 
directly from the sea may require non-traditional ship designs in order to support these 
new concepts. In order to gain insight on what we will need in the future, we developed a 
baseline simulation model utilizing the Arena® simulation software, representing a way 
we could exercise the SBL concept with today's capabilities. Having created the baseline 
model, we vary the inputs through two scenarios. After analyzing the results, we provide 
conclusions and recommendations for further research into the design of the new sea 
based logistics platform. 
D.   METHODOLOGY 
Research included: a detailed review of the OMFTS, STOM, SBL, and MPF (F) 
concepts, a review of current inter/intra ship materiel movement procedures and 
capabilities, familiarization with the Arena® simulation software package, development 
of a demand based operational scenario and simulation model, analysis of the simulation 
results, and providing recommendations for future platform capability. 
Our research pertaining to the Sea Based Logistics concept was conducted 
through a literature search of books, research documents, doctrinal publications and other 
library information sources.    Interviews with subject matter experts from both the 
military services and commercial sources provided experienced-based insight. 
E.        ORGANIZATION 
This chapter provided the background, purpose, scope, and methodology of this 
study. The subsequent chapters are organized to follow the structure described in the 
scope and methodology mentioned above. The rest of this project is organized as 
follows: 
II. OVERVIEW OF SEABASED LOGISTICS 
III. SIMULATION MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
IV. EXPERIMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Completed in 1934, after years of intense study by Marine officers, 
Tentative Landing Operations Manual, broke ground for a new science in 
the realm of warfare, a means for carrying an assault from the sea directly 
into the teeth of the most strongly defended shore. 
- General Holland M. Smith, USMC 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The way the United States has conducted warfare has changed continuously since 
the birth of our nation. New strategies and tactics have emerged with the development of 
new technologies, changing political climates and different global environments. Such 
was the case early in the 20th century after the close of WWI. War with Japan loomed 
inevitable to some visionaries within the Marine Corps. The concept of Amphibious 
Warfare was developed to defeat the Japanese Empire. In 1934 the Tentative Landing 
Operations Manual was published. This publication, which was largely theory, was 
explored up until the war started with Japan in 1941. It laid the foundation for all 
amphibious operations conducted throughout WWII, from the Pacific Island campaigns 
to the beaches of North Africa and Europe. [Ref. 5] 
The Marine Corps is once again facing a new world environment. Just as they did 
in the 1930's, the Marines are once again developing new concepts to counter the threats 
of the future. This chapter will explore these concepts. We first explain the operational 
concepts of OMFTS and STOM. We then focus on the concepts of SBL and MPF (F), 
and point out differences in our current capabilities and the capabilities of the future. We 
then provide an overview of our current inter/intra ship capabilities. 
B.        OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA (OMFTS) 
The Armed Forces of the United States, as they exist today, were primarily 
structured and equipped to counter the spreading threat of communism during the Cold 
War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the national security threats to the United 
States changed dramatically. The national security threats facing the United states today 
include: varying degrees of regional conflict and instability, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, and uncertainty about the future development of more powerful and 
direct threats to U.S. security. [Ref. 1] 
In order to meet the national security needs emerging from this new global 
environment the Marine Corps developed OMFTS. OMFTS has been described as "the 
cornerstone of Marine Corps efforts to shape its fighting doctrine, forces and weapons 
systems of the future". [Ref. 1] OMFTS targets the littoral regions of the world as the 
likely venue for future conflict. "While representing a relatively small portion of the 
world's surface, littorals provide homes to over 80 percent of the worlds capital cities and 
nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade". [Ref. 2] OMFTS also stresses that 
the warfare of the near future will be characterized by its great variety. Thus preparing 
for only one type of conflict and focusing on a single threat only increases the danger that 
we will be defeated by another threat. [Ref. 2] 
OMFTS merges the Marine Corps' Warfighting philosophy of Maneuver Warfare 
with Naval Warfare. OMFTS strives to exploit the ocean areas as maneuver space, in 
order to strike directly at operational objectives. This breaks from the current practice of 
first seizing and developing a beachhead prior to pushing out to strike operational 
objectives. In addition OMFTS: 
• Generates overwhelming tempo 
• Pits strengths against weakness 
• Emphasizes intelligence, deceptions and flexibility 
• Integrates all organic, joint and combined assets 
It is envisioned that OMFTS will provide naval expeditionary forces great flexibility to 
respond to any crisis at any time, in any objective within the littoral regions. [Ref. 2] 
C.       SHIP TO OBJECTIVE MANEUVER (STOM) 
One of the key implementing concepts for the goals established by OMFTS is 
STOM. While OMFTS states operational level goals, STOM is the tactical concept that 
applies "the principles and tactics to the littoral battle space" for conducting amphibious 
forcible entry. [Ref. 6] 
STOM uses the concepts of maneuver warfare to exploit the advances made in 
mobility and command and control (C2) systems. Ship-to-shore movement and control 
during an amphibious assault is traditionally slow and methodical. STOM seeks to take 
advantage of emerging technologies to turn ship-to-shore movement into amphibious 
maneuver. The landing force would assault directly from the ship without necessarily 
establishing a beachhead ashore as depicted in Figure 1. [Ref. 6] 
STOM's objective is to put the right sized units ashore, in their fighting 
formations, in a decisive place to accomplish the mission. Having the capability to 
operate from over the horizon (OTH), coupled with the ability to strike deep inland, 
STOM will force the enemy to defend a vastly larger area and provide the attacking 
forces with the element of tactical surprise. STOM uses the sea as a maneuver space. It 
emphasizes that the sea is "both a protective barrier and highway of unparalleled 
mobility" [Ref. 6]. Having control of the sea allows the landing force to take advantage 
of the enemy's gaps by taking the axis of advance of their own choosing 
Figure 1. Ship to Objective Maneuver [From Ref. 6]. 
STOM dictates the rapid movement of combined arms teams ashore. However, it 
stresses that command and control, logistics and fire support remain sea based.   Sea 
basing these three functions provides several advantages.    The first advantage is a 
reduced footprint ashore. Advances in information connectivity will allow command and 
control logistics, and fire support functions to be just as effective afloat as they are 
ashore today. Fewer personnel ashore translate to a reduced sustainment requirement for 
the total force ashore.  Support will be focused to the combat units.  Landing craft and 
vertical/short take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft that would have been used to 
transport the command element and logistics support ashore can now be utilized more 
effectively to support the combat units.  A reduced footprint also increases the mobility 
of the combat units by freeing them from being tied to a beachhead. [Ref. 6] 
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A second advantage sea basing provides, is the decreased vulnerability of the 
command elements and support forces to enemy attack. Sea basing essentially eliminates 
the need for a large rear area security force. Without a rear area to protect, combat forces 
can focus on operations. This also takes away a lucrative target for the enemy. 
Ultimately STOM enables the landing force to project combat units that are leaner, 
lighter and more effective. [Ref. 6] 
By striking objectives directly from the sea, the amphibious operation will 
terminate with the accomplishment of the mission vice the transfer of command and 
control ashore as in current doctrine. After accomplishing the mission the maneuver 
forces can either transition to subsequent operations ashore or re-embark to Amphibious 
Task Force (ATF) shipping to prepare for another operation. 
There is an inherent challenge in providing logistics support to units operating 
under the STOM concept. Sea basing logistics support in effect makes our current 
logistics "push" techniques undesirable and infeasible. [Ref. 6] Units will have to 
operate under a logistics "pull" concept. They will need to have the ability to transmit 
their needs to the sea base, and the sea base will in turn supply them directly. This 
implies that a requirement for Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and the ability to selectively 
offload supplies. STOM envisions delivering tailored logistics packages directly to the 
supported unit. [Ref. 6] 
D.       SEA BASED LOGISTICS (SBL) 
SBL is the implementing concept for logistics support in accordance with the 
OMFTS and STOM concepts.    SBL outlines the requirement for operational and 
logistical support of forces operating ashore under the OMFTS and STOM concepts. 
Having the ability to provide logistics functions directly from the sea base instead of from 
a cumbersome CSSA ashore will greatly reduce or eliminate the shore based logistics 
footprint associated with traditional amphibious operations. [Ref. 7] This provides the 
advantage of focusing on supporting the combat forces ashore without having the burden 
of providing rear area security (RAS) for the large amount of personnel and equipment 
associated with the CSSA. SBL also effectively eliminates the "iron mountain" of 
supplies currently required ashore to support of amphibious operations. SBL can also 
sustain the future high optempo battlefield and exploit the advantages of mobility and 
OTH standoff envisioned for in OMFTS. 
Currently, limited sea basing is exercised in naval doctrine and practice. Moving 
to full sea basing will mean expanding on current practice and exploit emerging 
technology to be able to meet future tactical and operational sustainment needs. [Ref. 1] 
Key to this is the ability to provide "in stride sustainment". This will require merging 
ship-to-objective distribution with a network based automated logistics information 
system. 
SBL requires the ability to perform the following five functions of logistics: 
supply and sustainment, transportation and distribution, maintenance, engineering and 
health service support. These functional areas today are performed both ashore and from 
ships. SBL requires them all to have the ability to be performed while sea based. 
Incorporating these functions with the tenets of SBL described below provides a great 
advantage to naval expeditionary forces. SBL requires implementing these five 
fundamental tenets into our operating procedures to provide sustainment. These are listed 
and explained below. 
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1.        Primacy of the Sea Base 
The primacy of the sea base will be its ability to build, project and sustain combat 
power. It will integrate all logistics functions aboard the sea based logistics platform. 
The sea base is envisioned to possess the ability to provide all combat service support 
functions afloat instead of ashore as in current practice. It will be able to provide 
indefinite support, serving as a floating workshop and distribution center. With the 
reduced logistical footprint ashore, much of the double handling of equipment and 
supplies that occurs today in a CSS A ashore will be eliminated. Under this concept 
maneuver units will have mobile combat service support units integral to them. They 
will carry their initial support requirements and the sea base will sustain them indefinitely 
by surface or by air as necessary. The sea base will then be replenished directly from 
sources in the continental United States (CONUS) or from around the world. SBL also 
frees the amphibious force from basing rights and host nation support. Sustaining an 
operation from the sea, gives naval expeditionary greater flexibility in conducting 
operations. [Ref. 3] 
2.        Reduced Demand 
SBL aims to achieve higher levels of support through reduced demand on 
transportation and materiel resources. With improvements in operating efficiencies, 
reliability of equipment, precision ordnance and targeting, improved and alternate fuel 
efficiencies, demands for sustainment should be reduced ashore. Improved information 
technology can replace mass (the iron mountain ashore) with speed and information. 
This allows sustainment to be routed directly to the end user eliminating the need for the 
CSS A ashore to act as the middleman. 
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Demand will also be reduced by the very nature of OMFTS. Sea basing the 
elements of the landing force mentioned previously reduces the footprint of forces 
ashore, thus reducing sustainment requirements. Furthermore consolidating supplies 
aboard the sea base allows the amphibious force to carry fewer inventories. [Ref. 3] 
3.        In-Stride Sustainment 
Automated requisition and distribution management systems will reduce costs, 
accelerate materiel movement and reduce redundant handling of materiel. Implementing 
a logistics "pull" system will enable logistics managers to take a management-by- 
exception approach. The requesting unit will request generated demand only from what 
they need, freeing the supporting unit from educated guesses on what demand is. This 
technique will eliminate the need for large quantities of materiel, which may not be 
needed, being moved and staged ashore. The ability to sustain highly mobile forces 
ashore from the sea base at any time greatly enhances the combat power and flexibility of 
these units. Additionally it provides commanders greater flexibility in planning and 
managing their resources ashore. 
SBL requires an inherent selective offload capability. The ability to rapidly 
provide tailored logistics packages aboard the SBL platform is necessary. [Ref. 1] These 
packages will be built aboard the platform and transported via surface or aerial means 
directly to the requesting unit. Currently naval expeditionary forces have a very limited 
capability to do this, due to the design of our amphibious ships. The Combat Service 
Support Element (CSSE) currently performs the majority of this function ashore. SBL 
requires the CSSE to perform the majority of this function from the sea base platform. 
Implied in this task is the need to design a platform capable of doing this. [Ref. 3] 
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4. Adaptive Response and Joint Operations 
SBL  envisions the capability to  integrate with theater logistics resources. 
Adaptability to dynamic operational requirements is necessary. SBL needs to support a 
wide spectrum of military operations, from forcible entry to disaster relief. Some 
operations may not initially have a port or airfield available. Once a port and/or airfield 
are secured, SBL will have the capability to transition part or all of its combat Service 
Support (CSS) functions ashore. This allows the Joint force Commander (JFC) greater 
flexibility in planning. Once follow-on forces arrive, the amphibious force can initially 
support them from the sea base. [Ref. 3] 
5. Force Closure and Reconstitution at Sea 
SBL allows forces to convene and assemble enroute to an objective. The key to 
this process is the physical merging of personnel and their equipment at sea. Assembling 
at sea eliminates the need for a secure port and airfield to accomplish this task. Combat 
power can be built-up at sea prior to engaging in combat. In the past, forces may have 
been required to seize a port and/or airfield prior to the arrival of the main force. This 
may have required engaging enemy forces. SBL eliminates this step. In turn, it gives the 
naval expeditionary force a greater element of tactical surprise since it limits your 
enemy's knowledge of the exact time and place of your landing and denying him the time 
to prepare for it. As follow on forces arrive in theater, SBL can support the force closure 
of joint and coalition forces. [Ref. 3] 
The ability to reconstitute at sea, as needed, is also a combat multiplier. The JFC 
will gain additional flexibility for dealing with emerging situations.  The ability to pull 
forces from one objective ashore, bring them back to the sea base to reconstitute them, 
and re-deploy them can be extremely advantageous to the commander. 
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The sea base will have a strategic pipeline to CONUS and other sources of 
supply. Rapid replenishment of the sea base directly from these sources without an 
interruption of operations ashore is a valuable asset to the commander. The sea base 
possesses an intermediate level of maintenance for its organic equipment. Equipment 
requiring depot level repair will be returned to CONUS or an intermediate staging area. 
These functions today are done by the CSSE ashore. Sea basing them reduces the logistic 
footprint ashore, gaining the advantages mentioned previously. [Ref. 3] 
E.       MARITME PRE-POSITIONED FORCE (FUTURE) (MPF (F)) 
MPF (F) is the concept, that requires the future generation of MPF's to contribute 
to forward presence and power projection. MPF (F) is envisioned to integrate and 
compliment the concepts of OMFTS and Sea based logistics. MPF (F) will be an integral 
part of SBL. The development of the next generation of MPF ships will incorporate the 
tenets of SBL. This is significant because the design of these ships will influence the 
design of the future SBL platform. [Ref. 4] 
Currently, there are three MPF squadrons that can each support a Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). Each squadron contains enough materiel and equipment 
to sustain a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of approximately 19,000 marines and 
sailors for 30 days. MPF can rapidly deploy a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
through a combination of Strategic Airlift and forward deployed Maritime Prepositioning 
Ships.   An airfield and secure port is necessary for the force closure of the MAGTF. 
Enhancements have been added to the MPF and will include an Expeditionary Airfield, a 
Navel Mobile Construction Battalion, a Fleet Field hospital and additional equipment and 
sustainment. While the MPF today can conduct in-stream offloading and limited combat 
loading, a larger capability will be required for OMFTS. [Ref. 3] 
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Future MPF operations are based on the following pillars: 
• Force Closure. MPF will provide for the at-sea arrival and assemble of the 
MPF. This eliminates the need to secure a port and airfield. The force will 
be prepared for operations when they arrive in the objective area. 
• Amphibious task force integration. MPF ships will integrate with the ATF 
as depicted in Figure 2 to further enhance the combat power of the ATF. 
Multi-purpose in nature the ships will be able to assume tactical roles. 
They will possess lighterage that can operate in sea state three. This will 
be accomplished on its own or through the sea base. 
• Redeployment and reconstitution. MPF will conduct in-theater 
replenishment. This gives it the ability to rapidly move to follow-on 
missions. 
Figure 2.        ATF Integration prom Ref. 4]. 
Like SBL, MPF (F) offers inherent force protection and the ability to exploit the 
sea as a maneuver space. It provides fast deployment and reinforcement capabilities to 
the MAGTF. It offers great flexibility to commanders. It also provides an opportunity to 
experiment with technologies and techniques that can be incorporated into the sea base 
platform of the future. [Ref. 4] 
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F.        CURRENT INTER/INTRA SHIP MATERIEL MOVEMENT 
Implied in the previously described concepts is the need for a platform designed 
to facilitate the rapid transfer of materiel. Currently amphibious ships are not designed to 
support the types of logistics operations envisioned in SBL. Our ships were designed to 
maximize stowage capability and facilitate the combat offloading of equipment and 
supplies. They were designed for offload by slow moving landing craft and aircraft in 
relative proximity to the shore. Dedicated staging areas for breaking down incoming 
supplies and repackaging them for distribution do not exist [Ref. 8]. Storage areas aboard 
these ships are largely inaccessible while the ship is fully loaded, without major re- 
arrangement. Movement within the ship is restricted to narrow fire lanes barely wide 
enough for materiel handling equipment (MHE). [Ref. 9] 
Underway replenishment (UNREP) is most commonly accomplished by either 
connected replenishment (CONREP) or by vertical replenishment (VERTREP). Landing 
craft or ships boats can also be used to re-supply via surface. The most common form of 
UNREP for amphibious ships is by VERTREP [Ref. 10]. Material is slung in cargo nets 
under a helicopter from ship to ship. This procedure takes time, while the pilots hover 
and personnel connect the nets to the airplane. They then fly to and from the supporting 
and supported ships. [Ref. 10] 
Typically when supplies are received, they arrive on pallets built to maximize 
space. These are brought aboard and large working parties of sailors and marines break 
them down by hand and deliver them throughout the ship. If the pallets are destined for 
cargo holds, forklifts move them to elevators or their final destination. Since the ships 
are loaded to capacity, storage for the new supplies is difficult to find. Material is either 
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moved by hand or brought closer to its final destination by materiel handling equipment 
(MHE), and then moved by hand. Many cargoes are further restricted by regulations due 
to their hazardous nature. 
Currently, because of the nature of combat loading, inventories of supplies are not 
easily accessible. Ships are not loaded like supply warehouses. Inventory is jammed into 
embark boxes, containers and anywhere one can find room. Much care is placed into 
asset visibility, but due to the lack of space, asset visibility can erode as time passes. 
All methods of replenishment are greatly affected by the sea state. If it gets too 
rough, UNREP operations can shut down. [Ref. 9] 
G.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have examined the future Warfighting concept of OMFTS. We 
then examined the tactical implementation of this concept in STOM. In order to make 
OMFTS a reality, OMFTS must be supportable. SBL is the concept envisioned to do 
this. Next we examined the concept of MPF (F). Implied from these concepts is a need 
for sea-based platform that can accomplish the goals set out in SBL. A radically new 
approach to ship design is required. We finally explored some of the limitations of 
current amphibious ship design. The following chapters will generate some specific 
mission requirements to be considered for the design of the sea base platform. 
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III.    SIMULATION MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A simulation model provides the means to replicate a system or process over a 
period of time normally through a computer with simulation software. Since computing 
power has become relatively inexpensive, a computer simulation is an extremely 
powerful tool to experiment with existing or future systems without expending the 
resources required for an experiment with the physical system. This rings especially true 
given the constrained resources present in today's military environment. Simulation 
allows developers to gain insight into a system's performance prior to actually building 
the physical system. [Ref. 11] 
This chapter incorporates a simulation model representing aspects of the current 
UNREP process blended into an operational scenario that has the landing force operating 
under the tenets of the OMFTS and SBL concepts developed in Chapter II. We will 
present the background scenario for the model, our modeling approach and a detailed 
description of our methodology in translating the model into simulation logic using the 
commercially available ARENA® simulation software. 
B. SCENARIO 
A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) sized MAGTF (1,500 personnel) has been 
conducting operations ashore for 7 days. They anticipate this operation to last another 7- 
10 days.  The landing force consists of the GCE and a Mobile Combat Service Support 
Detachment (MCSSD) from the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) in direct support. 





Figure 3.        Scenario Overview 
Aviation, Command and Control, and Logistics support (with the exception of the 
MCSSD) remained sea-based aboard the LHD. The landing force maintains two days of 
supply (DOS) within the MCCSD and requests a re-supply when they reach one DOS. By 
the end of the day they will reach the one DOS re-order point and will require a re-supply 
within twenty-four hours. The LHD had deployed with 15 DOS. The landing force has 
used eight DOS to date. The LHD is receiving an UNREP today often DOS to replenish 
its stocks. This re-supply consists of the palletized types of supplies listed in Tablel. 
Pallet Type Description # of Pallets 
1 MRE 79 
2 Ammunition 68 
3 Misc. 79 
Table 1. Pallet Types. 
The supplies listed above are aboard a supply ship that has just arrived on station. 
VERTREP operations will transfer the cargo to the LHD.    This process must be 
completed as quickly as possible because the LHD cannot perform normal flight 
operations in support of the ground forces until the UNREP operations on the flight deck 
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and hangar bay are completed. The ship will not return to full flight operation capability 
until all cargo is cleared from the flight deck and hangar bay. Two CH-46's from the 
supply ship will conduct the VERTREP. 
Once the UNREP process is complete the re-supply of the landing force will 
commence. Two DOS of each type of cargo will be moved up from its stored position in 
the holds and unit stow area. It will be staged on the flight deck and prepared for 
helicopter transport to the landing force ashore. 
C.       MODELING APPROACH 
This section details the integration of the scenario into the creation of the 
simulation model. We describe in detail the methodology, which defines the model 
scope, and assumptions used in developing the model. We then describe the data 
collected, and how it was assigned to the resources used in the model. This sets the stage 
for the next section, which describes our simulation approach. 
1.        Model Scope 
We limit our scope to the inter/intra ship and ship-to-objective materiel movement 
in an OMFTS scenario, and therefore start with the transfer of a pre-determined quantity 
of supplies from a supply ship to a SBL platform, continue the movement within the 
platform and end with the movement of supplies to the objective ashore. We exclude the 
assembly and pre-staging of palletized cargo aboard the supply ship and assume this has 
already occurred. We do not consider weather effects, sea-state conditions or personnel 
and equipment casualties. 
To meet the objectives for this thesis, we limit the model to the following 
elements: 
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a pre-determined number of cargo types 
one supply ship and one receiving ship 
two CH-46 helicopters 
a pool of nine 6k forklifts and eight 4k forklifts 
three cargo and one deck-edge elevators aboard the receiving ship 
2.        Conceptual Model 
The scenario developed for this model places a notional MAGTF ashore, 
operating in sustained combat type conditions. The primary purpose of this scenario is to 
generate demand for re-supply from the sea based MSSG aboard Amphibious Readiness 
Group (ARG) shipping using the SBL concepts.   These represented the demand-based 
inputs shown in the conceptual model depicted in Figure 4.   Using the current force 
structure and capabilities of an ARG/ MEU, we estimated the landing force daily 
sustainment rate for Class I, (Meal, Ready to Eat, (MRE)) and Class V (w) ground 
ammunition.    Additionally we combined things like lumber, repair parts and other 
supplies  into  a  third  category  labeled  Miscellaneous.     These  daily  sustainment 
requirements were then translated into pallet requirements for each type of cargo as 




Inter-ship       Intra-ship        Ship-to-shore 
Figure 4. Conceptual Model. 
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We decided to limit the re-supply effort to these three classifications of supplies 
for several reasons. First, the supply types we chose represent some of the bulkiest and 
most mission-critical. Bulk liquids like fuel and water are also very bulky and critical, 
but were omitted because we wanted to concentrate on the flow of palletized loads 
through the system. MRE's, ammunition and the miscellaneous type provide a sufficient 
sample size to exercise the system, while keeping the model relatively simple. At the 
same time, they provide enough complexity to exercise and represent the inter/intra ship 
materiel movement system. Second, each type of pallet chosen has different 
characteristics and once aboard the receiving ship, takes a different path and utilizes 
different materiel handling equipment. The combined mix of pallet types provides an 
overall representation of the types of supplies that would actually be needed by a MEU 
sized MAGTF operating in a situation like we present in this chapter, and are 
summarized in Table 2. 
Pallet Type Description # of Pallets Wt in lbs/pallet Destination Elevator 
1 MRE 79 918 Hold # 9 #5 
2 Ammunition 68 2200 50% Hold #4 Lower 
50% Hold #5 Lower 
#1 
#3 
3 Misc. 79 1500 Upper Vehicle N/A 
Table 2. Pallet Type Summary. 
Having the palletized cargo as input to the model, we chose to place it aboard a 
supply ship that is on station to re-supply the MEU. This began the inter-ship phase of 
our model. From the supply ship the palletized cargo was moved to the receiving ship, 
the LHD in our scenario, by two CH-46 helicopters. A key assumption at this point was 
made to have only these three types of pallets moved to the ship. In reality, the UNREP 
would include other landing force supplies, and possibly ships provisions and stores. 
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The rate of transfer used in our model was 20 lifts per hour. Since we were using 
minutes as our unit of time in this model this translated into one lift every three minutes 
on average. This planning factor was taken from [Ref. 10]. 
Since the SBL platform has yet to be defined in concrete terms, we needed a 
known capability to model as our starting point. An LHD was selected as the sea-based 
platform to be modeled in this scenario.  In choosing the LHD we asked the following 
question; which current amphibious ship would provide the best ability to support 
OMFTS in terms of SBL if we had to do it today? The LHD/LHA classes of ships were 
determined to possess the best capability, capacity and flexibility to accomplish this. 
They each possess approximately the same capability, however, the LHD was ultimately 
chosen because it is newer, and the author was more familiar with it.   The intent of 
simulating the LHD was not to suggest that a LHD be the SBL platform, but to represent 
a platform with LHD-like capabilities as a base model rather than an LHD itself. 
Estimated movement times for elevators and forklifts were gathered from interviews with 
personnel familiar with combat cargo operations. 
[Ref. 12] and [Ref. 13], which included detailed deck diagrams, were used to 
discern the relative location of the various forklifts, elevators and holds. The model 
assumes that there is enough room to accommodate all of the oncoming supplies in the 
chosen holds. The holds chosen and the elevators that access them are listed in Table 2. 
We used the normal underway storage locations listed in [Ref. 12] for the initial 
allocation and placement of available forklifts as shown in Table 3. Ten additional 4k 
forklifts were distributed throughout the holds and magazines [Ref. 12]. The model 
assumes that these ten forklifts were available for use in the chosen holds. 
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Resource Quantity 
Flight Deck 4ks 4 
Flight Deck 6ks 6 
Hangar Bay 4ks 3 
Hangar Bay 6ks 3 
Table 3. Forklift Allocation. 
Once the pallets arrived on the flight deck of the LHD, they were disconnected 
from the CH-46. Then a 4k forklift picked them up and traveled to either a cargo elevator 
or one of the deck edge elevators (aircraft elevators) [Ref. 14]. This began the intra-ship 
phase of the model. The pallet flow is depicted in Figures 5a, 5b and 5c. 
Ammunition pallets vary greatly in size, hazard classification and weight, 
dependant on the type of ammunition. To simplify the simulation and still provide a 
meaningful level of detail for analysis, we decided to split the ammunition pallets into 
two hazard classifications based on estimated percentages for one day of ammunition 
(DOA) for a typical MEU sized MAGTF. [Ref. 15] Each group represented ammunition 
of similar hazard classes, and was moved to separate holds. 
Type-2 Pallets destined for holds number 4 or 5 were loaded on cargo elevators 1 
or 3 respectively, at flight deck level. They could also be lowered on the deck edge 
elevator and moved by 6K forklifts down the ramp to cargo elevators 1 or 2 on the third 
deck. However, we decided to only utilize the flight deck access to Elevators 1 and 3 to 
minimize the ammunition handling process. 
In our model, type-1 and type-3 pallets were transported from the flight deck and 
placed on the deck edge elevator. This process was estimated to take one minute [Ref. 
14]. Once a batch of 20 pallets accumulated on the elevator, the elevator was lowered to 
the hangar bay. This movement was estimated to take two minutes. [Ref. 16] Forklifts 
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then moved the pallets from the deck edge elevator to a staging area in the hangar bay. 
The process for each pallet was estimated to take one minute. [Ref. 14] Once the elevator 
was empty it returned to the flight deck. 
From this staging area in the hangar bay, type-1 pallets took an estimated two 
minutes per pallet [Ref. 16] to move to elevator number 5 and were then lowered to hold 
number 9. All three cargo elevators used in the baseline model were estimated to take no 
more than two minutes to travel between decks. [Ref. 16] Additionally, all three cargo 
elevators accommodated four pallets at one time with a limit of 12,000 pounds [Ref. 12]. 
Pallets Arrive 
: 2 Pallets 
Type 1 & 3 Pallets Flight Deck 
t 
A/C Elevator 
Elevators 3 & 1 
Forward 
Figure 5a.       Pallet Flow (Flight Deck). 
Hangar Bay Staging Area Ramp Down to Upper V 




Figure 5b.       Pallet Flow (Hangar Deck). 
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Ramp From Hangar Deck 
Upper V Storage 
s6T:.;:***r>^ 
Type 3 Pallets ^ ■■■■■IIP 
Upper V Staging Area 
Figure 5c.       Pallet Flow (Upper V). 
Type-3 pallets took an estimated five minutes to move by 6k forklifts to the upper 
vehicle storage area (3rd deck) [Ref. 14].   These pallets were then broken down and 
stowed in Landing Force containers and spaces. The 6k forklifts were the only forklifts 
capable of moving pallets up and down the ramps between decks.  Completion of this 
process signaled the end of the intra-ship phase of the model. 
Conceptually, the third phase, ship-to-objective movement can begin while either 
of the previous two phases are occurring. We assume, however that the flight deck and 
hangar bay would be too cluttered with pallets, personnel, debris and MHE to execute 
normal flight operations during the first two phases. Thus, we decided to start the sbip- 
to-objective movement phase after all cargo reached its final destination. 
The sbip-to-objective movement phase begins with the supplies required by the 
landing force ashore being brought up from where they were stowed, to the flight deck 
for onward movement In our baseline model, the demand from the landing force was 16 
pallets of each type of supply representing approximately 2 DOS. We assumed these 
pallets would travel essentially in reverse, along the same routes described above. Once 
they reached the flight deck, they were flown ashore by landing force CH-53 helicopters. 
Using planning factors extracted from [Ref. 1] we estimated the CH-53 could carry four 
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pallets with a total weight of 10,000 lbs. It was estimated that the CH-53 could go from 
the LHD to the objective ashore, roughly 50 nautical miles, in 30 minutes. Our model 
does not take into consideration tactical limitations, enemy fire, or weather effects. It 
also assumes that once a Ch-53 is loaded it flies directly to the landing force. Once 
ashore, the pallets were received by the MCSSD. This ends the ship-to-objective 
movement phase. 
D.       SIMULATION APPROACH 
Having developed the model, we then translated the model boundaries, processes 
and input data into a simulation model using the ARENA® software package. 
1. Entities 
Entities are dynamic objects that move around, change status, affect or are 
affected by the state of the system, and affect the output performance measures [Ref. 11]. 
The baseline simulation required three entities to represent the three pallet types listed 
previously in Table 1. 
2. Attributes 
For our baseline simulation, two attributes were assigned to each entity when they 
were created. To differentiate the pallet types throughout the system, we assigned the 
attribute, type. A value of 1, 2, and 3 was assigned to each type. We also assigned the 
attribute amount to each of the three entities, with a value representing the total number 
of each type. As the entities were "flown" to the LHD the amount was deducted from the 
current amount attribute's value by the value listed in Table 4. 




Table 4. Attribute Value. 
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As the pallets left the supply ship they were deducted by the corresponding 
amount listed for each pallet type in Table 4 from the total value assigned previously to 
the amount attribute. This process continued until the total amount value reached zero. 
3.        Resources 
Forklifts, elevators, the flight decks, and helicopters were represented in this 
simulation by assigning them as RESOURCES or TRANSPORTERS. The 
RESOURCES and TRANSPORTERS used in the baseline model are listed below in 
Table 5. 
Resource Quantity Resource type 
Elevator 1 1 Transporter 
Elevator 3 1 Transporter 
Elevator 5 1 Transporter 
Elevator AC 1 Transporter 
Flight Deck 4ks 4 Resource 
Flight Deck 6ks 6 Resource 
Hangar Bay 4ks 3 Resource 
Hangar Bay 6ks 3 Resource 
LHD Flight Deck 1 Resource 
Supply Ship Flight Deck 1 Resource 
Table 5. Resource/Transporter Matrix. 
a.        Forklifts 
The forklifts on the flight deck and hangar bay level were pooled into 
three resource SETS; flight deck forklifts, hangar bay 6ks and hangar bay 4ks. Each one 
of these sets represented the number of forklifts by type, available on the LHD flight deck 
and hangar bay.  When an entity required the use of a resource it SEIZED the resource. 
The resource then provided a forklift from the resource set. If no forklifts were available, 
the entity waited until a forklift within the set became available. For example, to move a 
pallet from the hangar bay staging area to elevator 5, the pallet SEIZED the resource set, 
Hangar bay 4k and 6k. Once an available forklift was SEIZED the pallet was routed to 
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elevator 5. Once this was completed the entity RELEASED the forklift. After another 
DELAY, representing the time it took the forklift to return to the staging area, the forklift 
was then available to move another pallet. 
b.        Elevators 
Similarly, the TRANSPORTER module was used to simulate the elevator 
movements. To use the TRANSPORTER module, STATIONS were defined identifying 
the entrance to the elevators and the destinations of the elevators. STATIONS simulated 
physical locations throughout the model. All STATIONS and their corresponding 
locations are summarized in Table 6. 
Station Name 
LHD 









Hold 4 lower 
Hold 5 lower 
Hold 9 
Landing Force 
LHD Flight Deck 
Supply Ship Flight Deck 
CH-46 Holding area 
Starboard deck edge elevator 
Entry to Elevator 1 on LHD Flight deck 
Entry to Elevator 3 on LHD Flight deck 
Entry to Elevator 5 on LHD Hangar deck 
Hold 4 lower 
Hold 5 lower 
Hold 9 
Table 6. 
Landing Force Ashore 
Stations. 
Once STATIONS were defined, each elevator was assigned a DISTANCE 
block (distance between a pair of stations) to simulate the time it took the elevators to 
travel to their respective destinations. We estimated a two-minute travel time for the three 
cargo elevators. A velocity of one was then assigned within the TRANSPORTER 
module. Thus, the elevators traveled two units with a velocity of one unit. Since the 
baseline simulation used minutes as units, the elevators moved at a velocity of one unit 
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over a distance of two units (i.e., two minutes).   The same logic was applied to the 
aircraft elevator using a distance of three units and a velocity of one unit. 
c. Flight Decks 
The baseline simulation assumed the flight decks of the supply ship and 
LHD could only accommodate one helicopter at a time to load or unload pallets. In order 
to allow only one helicopter at a time to occupy the flight decks, each flight deck was 
assigned as a RESOURCE. Once the helicopters occupied (using SIEZE) the flight deck 
they were DELAYED one minute to simulate the process of approaching, hovering while 
picking up or dropping off pallets and then departing. They then RELEASED the flight 
deck RESOURCE. Once the flight deck was RELEASED, another helicopter could seize 
it. The model assumed that the staging areas and receiving areas on the flight decks are 
unconstrained. 
d. Helicopters 
Two CH-46 helicopters and two CH-53 helicopters were assigned as 
entities in the baseline simulation. Each type of helicopter was assigned as a single entity 
with a capacity of two. 
4. Queues 
Queues provide a place for an entity to wait until a resource becomes available. 
Queues were useful in this simulation to identify any constraints in the materiel 
movement flow. 
5. Events 
An event is "something that happens at an instant of simulated time that might 
change attributes, variables or statistical accumulators." [Ref. 11] In order to realistically 
represent the model developed in previous sections of this chapter, the following 
procedures were designated as required events for the simulation: 
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creation of three types pallets aboard the supply ship 
movement of the pallets to the LHD 
arrival of pallets aboard LHD 
movement of pallets to their destinations aboard the LHD 
designated number of pallets for movement to shore based objective 
movement of pallets to shore based objective 
end of simulation occurs when final pallet reaches the destination 
The baseline simulation clock started at time zero.  At this time the supply ship 
was on station and ready for the first movement. The pallets now started their journey 
through the system. Once a pallet arrived on the flight deck, the model forwarded the 
pallet to its designated path through the system. Each pallet type flowed through the 
system in the following manner: 
a.        Pallet Type-1 Flow 
Type-1 represented MRE pallets destined for Hold 9.   Once the model 
identified the pallet as type-1 it SEIZED a forklift from the flight deck 4k and 6k 
RESOURCE SET. The pallet was then ROUTED to the AC elevator. The pallets were 
BATCHED in groups of 20. After 20 pallets were on the AC elevator the elevator moved 
to the Hangar deck.  The pallets then SEIZED a forklift from the hangar bay 4k and 6k 
resource set.   After a DELAY of 15 seconds' simulating the loading, movement and 
unloading times they were ROUTED to the hangar bay staging area. Once all 20 pallets 
were moved from the elevator to the staging area in this manner, the AC elevator was 
RELEASED and returned to the flight deck.   Once in the staging area, and the model 
identified the pallet as type-1, the pallet SEIZED a forklift.   It was then routed with a 
Uniform (1,2) minute travel time to elevator 5. The pallet was now on the elevator. After 
a DELAY of one minute for unloading, the pallet RELEASED the forklift to return to the 
staging area. The forklift was now ready to load another pallet at the staging area. Since 
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elevator 5 had a four-pallet capacity, pallets were BATCHED in groups of four. Once 
four pallets were on the elevator they were TRANSPORTED to the station hold 9. After 
a DELAY of one minute, representing offloading time, the pallets DEPART the system. 
This represented the pallets' final destination. 
b. Pallet Type-2 Flow 
Type-2 pallets represented ammunition pallets.   As the pallet arrived it 
SEIZED a forklift from the flight deck RESOURCE pool. Once the model identified the 
pallet as type-2, 50 percent of type-2 pallets were randomly ROUTED with travel times 
of Uniform (1,2) minutes to elevator 1 and 50 percent with travel times of Uniform (1,2) 
minutes to elevator 3, which were accessed at flight deck level. A DELAY of one minute 
was then required to simulate the time before the forklift could be used again. The 
forklift was then RELEASED and immediately picked up the next pallet if there was one 
to be moved. Once the pallets were on their respective elevators the process was the 
same as described above for pallet type-1, the only difference being the elevators and 
final destinations of the pallets. The pallets then DEPART the system. 
c. Pallet Type-3 Flow 
Type-3 pallets represented miscellaneous supplies. Type-3 pallets flowed 
from the flight deck to the hangar bay staging area exactly like type-1 pallets. From the 
hangar bay staging area, type 3 pallets SEIZED one of the hangar bay 6k forklifts and 
were ROUTED to the station, Upper V Storage, with an estimated Uniform (4,6) minutes 
for the forklifts' travel time. After a DELAY of Uniform (4,6) minutes the forklift was 
RELEASED. This DELAY represented the travel time back to the staging area. An 
arbitrary estimate of a 30-minute DELAY was assigned representing the manual 
breakdown, processing and re-storage of the materiel on these pallets.   Due to the 
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variability of this process, the value "EXPO (30)" (exponentially distributed with a mean 
of 30 minutes) was entered into this DELAY statement. This simulated the variability in 
the time it took to breakdown type-3 pallets. Finally type-3 pallets DEPART the system. 
6.        Statistics Collection 
The time the LHD spends "connected" to the supply ship and the time the LHD 
spends conducting the entire UNREP process, keeps the ship from its primary mission of 
supporting the landing force. Therefore our primary performance metric was the overall 
cycle time of the system, starting with the time the first pallet left the supply ship to the 
time the last pallet was stored on the LHD. Our secondary performance metric was 
VERTREP cycle time, which represented the time it took to complete the UNREP 
portion of the model. By keeping track of these cycle times, we could assess the impact 
on cycle time of the modifications to the baseline model. 
E.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter we first presented a scenario based on the tenets of the OMFTS 
and SBL concepts. We then detailed the methodology used to develop our model. 
Finally we integrated the conceptual model into a simulation model. The simulation 
model presented in this chapter provided a baseline model for experimentation and 
analysis in Chapter IV. 
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IV.    EXPERIMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A.       OVERVIEW 
A  key  aspect  of simulation  modeling  is  the  verification,  validation  and 
experimentation process. Verification is the process that ensures the model behaves as 
you desire. This process is also referred to as "debugging". Validation ensures the 
model behaves in the simulation as it would in the real world. Experimentation allows 
you to modify the model to assess the impact of the modification on the system's 
performance. [Ref. 11] 
To verify the model, we simply ensured that the proper amount of pallets ended 
up at their proper destination. Since the model incorporated both current inter/intra ship 
materiel movement capabilities and future concepts, it was impossible to validate the 
model without actually conducting a real world experiment. Therefore we validated the 
portions of the model we could with the planning factors and time estimates described in 
Chapter III. 
B.        BASELINE SIMULATION 
The purpose of our simulation was to gain insight on materiel movement 
processes to further the development of the SBL concept. To accomplish this we decided 
to focus on the total cycle time of the inter/intra ship process and the UNREP cycle time. 
We set up the Arena® STATISTICS module to keep track of the total cycle time (TNOW 
in our model). We assigned the VARIABLE (MAX (END OF VERTREP (i)) (i= 1,2,3 
where i is the type of pallet) to gather UNREP cycle time statistics during the simulation. 
UNREP cycle time is important because the process is risky for several reasons. 
Operating large ships in close proximity is inherently risky. During the UNREP process 
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the ships typically slow down, decreasing the flexibility of maneuver.   They are also 
more vulnerable to enemy attack. Therefore decreasing UNREP cycle time reduces risk. 
To produce a sufficient sample size for meaningful statistical analysis we ran the 
simulation for 30 replications. The system and statistics were set to initialize at the start 
of each replication. The total inter/intra ship cycle time and UNREP cycle time for each 
replication was averaged over the 30 replications and recorded in the Output Summary 
shown in Figure 6. Additionally, the Output Summary recorded the average half-width 
minimum and maximum times observed over the 30 replications. 
Output Summary for 30 Replications/BASE MODEL 
Project: SBL Model 
Analyst: MJ Curtin 
Identifier 
Run execution date :  6/ 5/2001 
Model revision date: 2001/ 6/1904 
OUTPUTS 
Average    'A width Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(1), 
ENDOFVERTREP(l) 
ENDOFVERTREP(2) 
END OF VERTREP(3) 
396.12 11.213 349.85 478.75 30 
299.79 1.4321 291.62 307.08 30 
174.70 .93311 169.68 180.24 30 
299.79 1.4321 291.62 307.08 30 
237.00 1.1729 229.88 243.80 30 
Figure 6. Sample Arena® Output Summary. 
The baseline simulation resulted in a total cycle time (TNOW) of 396.12 minutes 
(6.6 hours). This represented the time from the first pallet departing the supply ship until 
the last pallet was stowed on the LHD.  The total UNREP cycle time (MAX (END OF 
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VERTREP (i)) was 299.79 minutes (5 hours). This was how long it took for all pallets to 
depart the supply ship. The difference between the total cycle time and the UNREP cycle 
time was 96 minutes. After the last pallet left the supply ship it took an additional 96 
minutes before the last pallet was stowed in the receiving ship. 
Also recorded were the UNREP cycle times for each pallet type (END OF 
VERTREP (i)). These times mark the time in the process that the last pallet of each type 
was free of the supply ship, as shown in Figure 5. These results indicate that the UNREP 
of type-1 pallets was completed first, type-3 second and finally type 2. Recall that due to 
the weights of the individual pallets, type-1 pallets were moved three at a time, type-3 
pallets were moved two at a time and type-2 pallets were moved one at a time. Thus, the 
order in which the three pallet types completed the VERTREP process is explained by the 
relationship between the individual pallet weights and the lift capacity of the CH-46. 
Additionally, the ship-to-objective phase of the model was run with two Ch-53 
helicopters and then again with four Ch-53 helicopters. The cycle time of this phase was 
recorded in the same way as in the other two phases. The additional two helicopters 
reduced cycle time by 49 percent. This was linearly proportionate to the increase in the 
number of helicopters since the travel time had little variability. The model output also 
indicated a small bottleneck in the cargo elevators. This was due to the fact that no pre- 
staging of pallets on the flight deck was done. In reality, pallets would be pre-staged 
prior to the actual mission. Therefore a bottleneck with the cargo elevators may not be a 
factor. This does suggest however, that in a scenario with increased demand of re - 
supply materiel from a larger landing force, the cargo elevators may become a system 
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limitation if continuous throughput of materiel from the holds to the flight deck is 
required. 
C.       EXPERIMENTATION 
Reducing overall cycle time is very important during materiel transfer. Recall in 
our model that the LHD was not able to conduct full flight operations in support of the 
landing force until the flight deck and hangar bay were clear of pallets and debris. The 
quicker the transfer and stowage of materiel, the quicker the ship could resume its 
warfighting functions to include re-supplying the landing force. Conducting UNREP 
operations also limits the mobility and flexibility of the LHD, since the ship needs to 
remain "connected" (either physically for a CONREP, or as in our model, in close 
proximity to the supply ship for a VERTREP). The following experiments were 
conducted to assess what impact the modifications had on these cycle times. 
1. Modification One 
Overall cycle time for the baseline simulation was 396 minutes and UNREP cycle 
time was 300 minutes. We asked the question, "What is the impact on the overall and 
UNREP cycle times if we vary the number of CH-46s used during the UNREP?" 
Keeping all other conditions and assumptions from the baseline model the same we 
varied the number of CH-46s used for VERTREP from one to four. Additionally we 
assumed that up to four helicopters could be used without the helicopters getting in the 
way of each other. The outputs of this experiment are listed in Appendix B and 
summarized in Figure 7. 
The results of this experiment indicated that as the number of helicopters 
increased the total cycle time decreased.   However the most significant decrease of 
approximately 35 percent was experienced from the addition of one helicopter to two. 
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Cycle time decreased by a total of 22 minutes from the addition of the third and fourth 
additional helicopter. Total cycle time decreased 11 minutes with the addition of a third 
helicopter. The addition of the fourth helicopter decreased the total cycle time by an 
additional 11 minutes. 
UNREP and Total Cycle Time 
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Figure 7.        UNREP and Total Cycle Times. 
Similarly, the largest decrease-in UNREP cycle time came after the addition of the 
second helicopter. This was a decrease of approximately 45 percent The addition of the 
third and fourth helicopters decreased the UNREP cycle time by a total of 104 minutes. 
The decrease between the second and third additional helicopter was 94 minutes while 
the decrease for the fourth helicopter was 44 minutes. 
These results indicate that total cycle time is only marginally reduced with the 
addition of the third and fourth helicopters to conduct the UNREP. UNREP cycle time 
however, is significantly reduced with these additions. By increasing the number of 
resources used to transfer materiel between ships the two ships can spend less time 
"connected". However the total cycle time with the additional resources means the 
pallets move to the LHD very quickly and accumulate on the flight deck in large numbers 
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before they can be processed through the ship. The difference between the total cycle 
times and UNREP cycle times inferred a constraint within the intra-ship materiel 
movement process. This also suggested that if the priority for the LHD was to minimize 
the time spent "connected" to the supply ship,, then the additional helicopters would be 
valuable. If the priority was to reduce total cycle time, then the additional helicopter 
offered no significant value. 
2.        Modification Two 
Our second experiment addresses the question "what is the impact on the total and 
UNREP cycle times of increasing the lift capacity of the CH-46?" The baseline model 
was modified to simulate the increased capacity of the resource identified in our model as 
the CH-46 helicopter. We do not wish to imply that in reality the CH-46 has the 
capability or potential to lift the increased weight. We are simply using the simulation to 
quantify the impact on cycle time of the increased lift capability during the inter-ship 
materiel movement process. The results may also provide insight into future helicopter 
design. 
The lift capability was modified in the Arena® simulation logic by increasing the 
number of pallets deducted from the amount attribute. Recall that in the baseline model 
three type-1 pallets, one type-2 pallets and two type-3 pallets were moved at one time 
respectively by the CH-46s.  This assumed a 3,000-pound lift capability for the CH-46. 
For this experiment we doubled, tripled and quadrupled the lift capacity for the CH-46. 
This corresponds to 6,000, 9,000 and 12,000 pound lift capabilities for the CH-46 in our 
model. This modification assumed that the supplies were configured in pallet form as in 
the baseline model.   It was assumed that the helicopter could transfer the number of 
pallets representing the increased weight capability for each trip.   For example, type-3 
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pallets weighing 1,500 pounds each were moved two at a time for the baseline 
simulation, four at a time for the 6,000-pound capability simulation and so forth. 
As in the first experiment, we were interested in the total and UNREP cycle times. 
Keeping all other conditions and assumptions from the baseline model the same we ran 
the simulation. The output summary shown in Appendix C lists the results of this 
experiment and is summarized in Figure 8. 
Doubling the lift capacity of the helicopters to 6,000 pounds reduced total cycle 
time from the baseline model by 34 percent (134 minutes) and UNREP cycle time by 50 
percent (151 minutes). Tripling the lift capacity to 9,000 pounds reduced total cycle time 
by 56 percent (220 minutes) and UNREP cycle time by 66 percent (200 minutes). 
Quadrupling the lift capacity to 12,000 lbs reduced total cycle time by 48 percent (190 
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Figure 8. Experiment Two Results 
Total cycle time was reduced significantly between the 3,000 pound and 9,000 
pound capacities.   However there was a slight increase in total cycle time between the 
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9,000-pound capacity and the 12,000-pound capacity. This suggests that there is a 
limitation within the intra-ship materiel movement process aboard the LHD. With the 
increased lift capacity, pallets were shuttled to the LHD much faster. This meant that a 
greater number of pallets were assembled on the LHD flight deck awaiting transport to 
their final destinations. Since the model was designed to move pallets through the system 
the sheer number of pallets awaiting transport on the LHD flight deck caused a bottleneck 
due to resource limitations, thus increasing the total cycle time. Even with this slight 
increase the total cycle time was significantly reduced from the baseline simulation by 48 
percent. 
Overall, UNREP cycle time was reduced by 75 percent. A 50 percent reduction 
occurred between the 3,000 and 6,000 pound capacities. Significant reductions of 33 
percent and 26 percent were realized between the 6,000-9,000 pound capacity and 9,000- 
12,000 capacities, respectively. This suggests that the additional capacity has a 
significant impact on the UNREP cycle times. 
These results suggest that by increasing the lift capacity of the helicopters 
conducting the VERTREP, significant reductions in cycle times are achieved. The time 
the LHD has to spend "connected" to the supply ship and away from its primary mission 
is greatly reduced. 
D.       SUMMARY 
This chapter first explained the verification and validation of our baseline 
simulation model. We then conducted and analyzed two experiments by modifying the 
baseline model to see the impact on cycle times. The next chapter provides our 
conclusions, recommendations and areas for further study. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of Sea Based Logistics is an area rich with opportunities for research. 
Since the sea base platform has yet to be defined, any research offering insight into its 
design is potentially valuable. The more time that is invested in research, development 
and evaluation of this concept up front, the better the end product will be for the future 
generation of Marines and Sailors who will actually operate under it. This chapter 
summarizes our conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research into the 
concept of Sea Based Logistics. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1.        Increased Lift Capacity for Inter-Ship Materiel Movement 
Increasing the lift capacity of the helicopter conducting the UNREP in our model 
significantly reduced the total cycle time and UNREP cycle time of the inter/intra ship 
materiel movement process. Increasing the lift capacity of the CH-46 helicopter to 
12,000 pounds is unrealistic. However, increased lift should be considered in the design 
of future helicopters. We found raising the lift capacity of the helicopter conducting the 
UNREP operations from 3,000 pounds to 12,000 pounds decreased total cycle time by 48 
percent and decreased the UNREP cycle time by 75 percent. This reduction in cycle time 
is linearly proportional to the increase in lift capacity since the travel time (including 
loading and unloading times) had little variability. Other external factors not considered 
in this simulation, such as, weather, sea-state and enemy action would also affect the 
simulation results.   Reducing the UNREP cycle time reduces the risks involved with 
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UNREP operations such as collisions and vulnerability to enemy attack.   Additionally, 
UNREP operations limit flight operations on LHD-like ships. 
The time the LHD spends receiving and stowing landing force supplies decreases 
the ship's capability to support forces ashore in terms of close air support, helicopter 
assault support and logistical support.    The quicker the ship can complete UNREP 
operations, the quicker it can resume these essential functions.    This is extremely 
important in OMFTS operations.  Forces ashore relying on sea based logistical support 
will be operating with minimal safety stocks.   Receiving needed supplies on a timely 
basis will be critical.   If the sea based logistics platform is busy performing UNREP 
operations, its capability to support forces ashore is diminished.  Therefore, minimizing 
the time spent replenishing amphibious ships increases their ability to support the forces 
ashore. 
2.        Impact of Increasing the Number of Helicopters used for UNREP 
Increasing the number of helicopters used to conduct UNREP operations in our 
model only marginally decreased total cycle time. The increase from two to four CH-46 
helicopters only decreased total cycle time by an average of 22 minutes. However the 
increase to four helicopters reduced UNREP cycle time by 47 percent. Increasing the 
number of helicopters would only be of benefit if the mission priority was focused on 
completing the UNREP portion of the process. Essentially the pallets were "dumped" 
aboard the LHD flight deck very quickly. As the number of pallets awaiting movement 
from the flight deck increased, the utilization rate of the three cargo elevators also 
increased. This suggested that the cargo elevators were a bottleneck and could not move 
the pallets to their final destination at the same rate the pallets were received on the LHD. 
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During the ship-to-objective phase of the model, increasing the number of CH-53 
helicopters from two to four decreased the ship-to-objective cycle time by 49 percent. 
This reduction in cycle time is also linearly proportionate to the increase in lift capacity 
since the travel time had little variability and there were no operational constraints put 
into the scenario. 
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3.        Simulation Modeling 
Simulation models are used to gain insight on how systems behave.   They are 
especially effective in representing complex real-world systems that currently exist. 
Simulation models can be used to experiment with proposed systems. In this manner, 
simulation models can shed light on the behavior of the future systems or concepts that 
have yet to be designed. This is especially useful because any number of "what-if' type 
experiments can be performed to gain insight into the future system's performance. Our 
model was designed with this in mind. 
We developed our model for use as a tool to gain insight into the concepts of 
OMFTS and SBL.  The model represents aspects of our current inter/intra ship materiel 
movement capability blended into a scenario based on the above-mentioned concepts. 
Much time was spent on the design of the model in order to provide future researchers a 
tool to gain insight into the complex task of designing the sea based logistics platform 
that will support the concept of OMFTS. 
B.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.        Increased Lift Capacity for Inter-Ship Materiel Movement 
We recommend exploration into the development of a capability to increase the 
lift capacity during transfer of materiel from ship to ship. Our model focused on vertical 
replenishment by helicopter, however methods for connected replenishment should also 
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be considered. Our simulation model represented the cargo moving by pallets. In 
modification two, when we quadrupled the lift capacity of the helicopter to 12,000 lbs, 
the number of type-1 pallets being transferred was 12. Twelve individual pallets 
externally loaded and moved at one time seemed unrealistic. Further research into how 
cargo is packaged for movement is therefore recommended. 
2.        Impact of Increasing the Number of Helicopters Used for UNREP 
Using more than two helicopters for vertical replenishment appeared to have 
minimal impact on reducing cycle time. However, further research into the impact on 
cycle time of running multiple cargo receiving stations aboard the sea based logistics 
platform is recommended. Additionally, further study into the placement and 
composition of elevators, storage areas and materiel handling resources aboard the sea 
base platform is recommended. 
Additionally, further research into the conduct of the ship-to-objective movement 
phase is recommended. Tactical, operational and environmental considerations should be 
considered and incorporated into the model. 
3.        Simulation Modeling 
The experiments conducted in this thesis, were limited to assessing the impacts on 
cycle time by modifying only two variables. However, there is great potential for further 
experimentation into the subject of sea based logistics utilizing this model or one like it. 
This model was developed for modification and expansion as needed. Further research 
and opportunities to expand and refine the model include, but are not limited to the 
following: 
• incorporating the impact of environmental effects on operations 
• modeling the ship to objective phase of the model 
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assessing the impact of larger quantities of cargo through the system 
introducing personnel and equipment casualties into the model 
assessing the impact of different types of palletization and containerization 
of cargo on the materiel movement process 
incorporating tactical considerations on ship-to-objective movement 
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APPENDIX A. METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING DAILY 
SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS 
A.       METHODOLOGY 
Type-1 pallets- Class I (MRE) requirements are a function of the number of 
people ashore. Daily MRE requirements were computed by first multiplying the total 
number of personnel ashore (1,500) by the planning factor of three meals per day. This 
figure, (4,500), was multiplied by the total DOS required (10). This resulted in the total 
number of meals needed for the required length of time (45,000). A pallet of MRE's 
contains 576 meals (48 cases of 12 meals per case). Dividing the total MRE requirement 
by 576 results in a total pallet requirement of 79 pallets. 
Type-2 pallets-The number of Class V (w), ground ammunition pallets required 
for the landing force in our scenario were adapted from [Ref. 1]. [Ref. 1] lists the landing 
force daily sustainment requirements in short tons for a MEB sized unit of 6,806. Since 
our force was roughly 22 percent the size of the MEB sized unit, we multiplied the 
ammunition requirement for the MEB (33.48 short tons) by 22 percent. This came out to 
a daily requirement for our force of 7.3656 short tons per day. Multiplying this by ten 
gave us our ten-day gross requirement in short tons. After interviewing several people 
knowledgeable in the ammunition field, we estimated the average weight per ammunition 
pallet was roughly 2200 lbs. Dividing our gross requirement by the pallet weight resulted 
in a requirement for 68 pallets for the ten-day period. 
Type-3 pallets- the number of type-3 pallets required was also adapted from [Ref. 
1].  [Ref. 1] listed "other cargo" daily requirement of 26.54 short tons for a MEB-sized 
unit of 6,806.   Taking 22% of 26.54 gave us a daily requirement for our scenario of 
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5.8388. We arbitrarily estimated the pallet weight of 1,500 lbs for type-3 pallets. 
Multiplying the daily requirement of 5.8388 by 10 and dividing by the average pallet 
weight of 15001bs, gave us a gross requirement of 79 pallets. 
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APPENDIX B. ARENA OUTPUT SUMMARY FOR MODIFICATION 
NUMBER ONE 
ARENA Simulation Results 
NPS - License #9400000 
Output Summary for 30 Replications/ ONE HELO 
Project: SBL model Run execution date :   6/5/2001 
Analyst: MJCurtin Model revision date: 2001/6/1904 
OUTPUTS 
Identifier Average   Vi width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 635.81 12.557 585.95 734.67 30 
END OF VERTREP(3) 465.25 1.7471 452.53 473.91 30 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 587.63 2.1700 575.91 598.72 30 
END OF VERTREP(2) 587.63 2.1700 575.91 598.72 30 
END OF VERTREP(l) 342.60 1.3900 336.17 348.81 30 
Output Summary for 30 Replications/BASE MODEL 
Project: SBL Model Run execution date :   6/5/2001 
Analyst: MJCurtin Model revision date: 2001/6/1904 
OUTPUTS 
Identifier Average   ^ width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 396.12 11.213 349.85 478.75 30 
END OF VERTREP(3) 237.00 1.1729 229.88 243.80 30 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 299.79 1.4321 291.62 307.08 30 
END OF VERTREP(2) 299.79 1.4321 291.62 307.08 30 
END OF VERTREP(l) 174.70 .93311 169.68 180.24 30 
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Output Summary for 30 Replications/THREE HELOS 
Project: SBL Model 
Analyst: MJCurtin 
Run execution date :   61 5/2001 
Model revision date: 2001/6/1904 
Identifier 
OUTPUTS 
Average   lA width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 385.11 12.414 317.04 455.01 30 
END OF VERTREP(3) 161.40 .59027 158.99 164.17 30 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 204.09 .73705 201.22 208.14 30 
END OF VERTREP(2) 204.09 .73705 201.22 208.14 30 
END OF VERTREP(l) 119.16 .48395 116.91 122.22 30 
Output Summary for 30 Replications/FOUR HELOS 
Project: SBL Model 
Analyst: MJCurtin 
Run execution date : 




Identifier Average    54 width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 374.76 
END OF VERTREP(3) 127.20 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 160.76 
END OF VERTREP(2) 160.76 






















APPENDIX C. ARENA OUTPUT SUMMARY FOR 
MODIFICATION NUMBER TWO 
ARENA Simulation Results 
NPS - License #9400000 
Output Summary for 30 Replications/ ONE HELO 
Project: SBL model Run execution date :   6/5/2001 
Analyst: MJCurtin Model revision date: 2001/6/1904 
OUTPUTS 
Identifier Average   lA width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 635.81 12.557 585.95 734.67 30 
END OF VERTREP(3) 465.25 1.7471 452.53 473.91 30 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 587.63 2.1700 575.91 598.72 30 
END OF VERTREP(2) 587.63 2.1700 575.91 598.72 30 
END OF VERTREP(l) 342.60 1.3900 336.17 348.81 30 
Output Summary for 30 Replications/BASE MODEL 
Project: SBL Model Run execution date :   6/5/2001 
Analyst: MJCurtin Model revision date: 2001/6/1904 
'    OUTPUTS 
Identifier Average    /4 width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 396.12 11.213 349.85 478.75 30 
END OF VERTREP(3) 237.00 1.1729 229.88 243.80 30 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 299.79 1.4321 291.62 307.08 30 
END OF VERTREP(2) 299.79 1.4321 291.62 307.08 30 
END OF VERTREP(l) 174.70 .93311 169.68 180.24 30 
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Output Summary for 30 Replications/THREE HELOS 
Project: SBL Model 
Analyst: MJ Curtin 
Run execution date :   61 5/2001 
Model revision date: 2001/6/1904 
OUTPUTS 
Identifier Average    V2 width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 385.11 12.414 317.04 455.01 30 
END OF VERTREP(3) 161.40 .59027 158.99 164.17 30 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 204.09 .73705 201.22 208.14 30 
END OF VERTREP(2) 204.09 .73705 201.22 208.14 30 
END OF VERTREP(l) 119.16 .48395 116.91 122.22 30 
Output Summary for 30 Replications/FOUR HELOS 
Project: SBL Model 
Analyst: MJ Curtin 
Run execution date :   6/ 5/2001 
Model revision date: 2001/6/1904 
OUTPUTS 
Identifier Average    V2 width  Min      Max     # Replications 
TNOW 374.76 12.045 322.80 465.30 30 
END OF VERTREP(3) 127.20 .60052 123.08 130.98 30 
MAX(END OF VERTREP(l), 160.76 .67666 155.93 165.26 30 
END OF VERTREP(2) 160.76 .67666 155.93 165.26 30 
END OF VERTREP(l) 94.106 .42777 91.914 96.040 30 
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